deficits and debt service problems. In 1978 the government took over the external debt of the increasingly insolvent public corporations established to operate these projects. The following year, as Togo's external debt approached US$1 bn, the government was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund for assistance. Togo's economic history thereafter is a sad one. The deflationary policies adopted at the behest of the IMF were followed in 198 1-83 by one of the worst droughts of the century. Recovery since 1983, despite two World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans, has left the level of real economic activity (as measured by inflation adjusted GDP) in 1986 still five per cent below the 1980 peak, or almost 25 per cent lower at per capita level.
A Structural Overview
The structure of Togo's economy, despite a thin veneer of sophistication, is relatively underdeveloped. Agriculture, forestry and fishing employ some 70 per cent of the labour force, but contribute just over a quarter of gross domestic production. The technology used ranges from primitive subsistance farming in the interior of the country, to the plantations established by the Germans at the start of the century. The chief export crops are coffee, cocoa and cotton, which account for about a quarter of exports and around 10 per cent of government revenues, although a high proportion of the cocoa is smuggled from Ghana and is an index of Ghanaian instability, not of Togolese policies. The conditions of production of these commodities have, on balance, probably deteriorated, due to the drought, and the priority that the 17 A Background Sketch: Economic History of Togo According to World Bank estimates, Togo is a poor country with a per capita GNP under US$400 per annum. Even within this class, Togo's poverty is conspicuous, with per capita GNP around US$250 per annum. But while this probably overestimates how low GNP is, it understates the degree of misery of most Togolese. Lomé is an important entrepôt for its neighbour Benin and the Saharan countries to the north of Togo. Its urban trading economy has a high influence on these statistics disproportionate to the share of the population benefitting, but income from smuggling is significantly understated.
Togo is one of the smallest countries of West Africa, with 35km of coastline, and some 550km interior and Nigeria, Togo has had an African trading, tree crop agriculture and professional bourgeoisie for at least a century.
Between the world wars Togo's economy stagnated, so that in 1949 the volume of the country's exports was approximately at the same level as it had been in 1914, partly because of the 1920s commodities and 1930s general depression, and partly because France did not treat the Togo-Dahomey salient as a focus for colonial investment. However, this was succeeded by a period of rapid expansion. Whereas the first such period before the First World War has been based on the establishment of a plantation economy, the second period, during the 1950s, was based on major investments in infrastructure. These helped to integrate the country economically, as well as accelerating the pace of urbanisation. government of Togo has given since the late 1970s to food production, especially in the North while the government's claim that the country is self-sufficient in foodstuffs, while true in good weather years is precarious, and parallels widespread malnutrition, especially up country.
The most important commodity production sector is phosphate mining. It accounts for more than 40 per cent of exports and contributes about 17 per cent of government revenues. In the 1970s, made sanguine by record phosphate prices in export markets, the government embarked on an ambitious industrialisation and productive sector structural diversification programme that included textile mills, luxury tourist hotels, a steel mill, and an oil refinery. The government has also long harboured an ambition to establish Togo as ' France that assisted Eyadéma in re-establishing control after an attempted coup in September 1986. In the South the Ewe-who are prominent in the private and public bourgeoisie as well as dominating the pre-1967 government and among whom exist sentiments in favour of reunion (under whatever aegis) with their fellow Ewe in Ghana -have shown little enthusiasm for the Eyadéma regime.
Coming to Terms with Debt: Initial Cutbacks
As mentioned above, the origins of Togo's debt problem flow from the four-fold increase in phosphate prices that occurred in 1974, when Togo's terms of trade virtually doubled, also doubling government revenues. With a population growth rate averaging .3.3 per cent and a record of slow growth, the government had every reason to take advantage of circumstances which apparently made possible accelerated economic growth. New state enterprises were created and new investments were started in social services, infrastructure, public buildings, and the selected productive sectors of manufacturing and tourism. When phosphate prices and volume fell in 1975 and after, the government resorted to large-scale foreign borrowing on commercial terms to support continuation of the investment drive. While economic growth was initially boosted by vigorous investment activity, the latter was slow to show any returns in production. Those returns that have been obtained The conditions for IMF assistance were the usual ones, with the exception of devaluation of the currency, which is freely convertible at 50:1 to the French Franc. However, the government was forced to cut back its expenditures drastically -by almost 20 per cent in nominal and over 30 per cent in real terms in 1979. The bulk of these reductions fell on capital expenditure, a standard pattern in West Africa and in IMF-sponsored stabilisation, if less general elsewhere or in World Bank-led structural adjustment with growth programmes. The budget deficit fell to 6.9 per cent of GDP in 1982. However, due to a fall in export volume and a rise in import prices, the current account deficit only fell to 11.6 per cent of GDP in 1982. GDP itself in that year was 95 per cent of its level of 1979, after taking into account price changes, and it proceeded to fall by a further 8 per cent in the following year. The IMF was forced to admit that the two financial restructuring programmes of 1979-80 and 1981-82 respectively, which were the price ofIMF backing for agreements to reschedule Togo's debt payments, 'did not give the results anticipated' [IMF 1987:227] . By 1982 Togo abandoned attempts to meet IMF targets. Debt payment arrears as well as less macro economically visible delays in paying wages, salaries and other domestic government bills started to accumulate again.
-and the 1983 Adjustment Programmes As Togo's economic and financial situation deteriorated, the government and its advisers realised that a more carefully thought out and comprehensive recovery programme was required. In 1983 and 1984 even more stringent financial 'stabilisation' plans were adopted. In return the IMF provided two stand-by -improve the planning and implementation of public investment; rehabilitate public enterprises 'in association with the private sector', as part of which the oil refinery was shut down, with its tanks converted into storage facilities for refined petroleum products; -improve the strategy for rural development through 'appropriate' price and marketing policies for both export crops and food crops.
In 1985, a Second Structural Adjustment loan of SDR28.l mn was agreed. The main features of the programme on which successive tranches of this loan are being paid are:
-improved private sector incentives through higher producer prices, improved supplies to rural areas and tax reforms aimed at small and medium-sized industrial enterprises;
-further reductions in the scope of public sector enterprises and the transfer of public enterprises to the private sector. The ¡MF stand-by loans granted in 1984 and 1985, amounting to SDR19 mn and SDR37 mn respectively were followed in 1986 by US$10 mn from the World Bank's special facility for Africa. In June 1986 the ¡MF announced that it had granted Togo a two-year stand-by credit of SDR23 mn, and commended the country for the progress that it was making in meeting its demands. ¡n mid-1987 negotiations were still taking place on a Third World Bank Structural Adjustment agreement.
Conclusion: Toward Unstable Economic Stagnation?
The ¡MF and World Bank economic adjustment programmes can be criticised from a number of different social and economic points of view. The most obvious is the unprecedented economic austerity and contraction that they have inflicted on a country that was already one of the poorest in the world. The ¡MF and the World Bank would no doubt argue that this has been inevitable, and has even enabled Togo to avoid a worse fate. Less apparent, but arguably even more devastating from the point of view of economic One alternative, ¡MF borrowing, is in principle unsuitable and is not intended to support investment programmes, but to alleviate 'temporary' balance of payments difficulties. ¡n recent years, ¡MF aid to developing countries has tended to vary with the ratio of debt service payments to export earnings, albeit in 1985-87 net lending for sub-Saharan Africa has become negative. While in principle this may provide a weak inverse correlation between variations in export earnings and IMF aid, in practice this has been more than offset by the fiscal austerity that is a condition of that assistance. In Togo's case the budget deficit has been cut severely since 1981. Initially it was public investment that was cut most drastically, although later on higher revenues held down the deficit. The other source of development assistance has been governments and multilateral agencies, including the International Development Association. Although in recent years disbursements of official developments assistance have been rising (see Table 2 However, some of these statistics are unreliable. It could be argued that the lack of coordination of aid with export revenues is made up of relatively minor cases of temporary mis-timing. This argument would be better grounded if Togo had access to international credit markets to alleviate temporary financial shortfalls. But Togo has not had such access since the end of the 1970s. At the very best, then, this argument admits to inefficiency in the disbursement of aid. In the context of a poor country like Togo and with the precarious nature of the investment process, particularly in developing countries, this is a serious shortcoming. In any case, the overall capital inflow record (actual official grant transfers plus long term loan disbursements less repayments) set out in Table 1 A more serious argument is that the adjustment programmes are not intended to bear fruit immediately, but in the long run. However, it is difficult to see how this can be achieved when gross fixed capital formation recovery under the two structural adjustments has failed to recover even half of the decline in investment levels from 1980 to 1982. The amount of national income being committed to capital formation is still, in nominal terms, less than three fifths of the sums being spent on this in the peak year of 1979 and may well be below realistic depreciation estimates.
An even more fundamental set of inconsistencies is rooted in the World Bank and IMF's definition of self-sustaining economic growth. This is viewed currently by these institutions as a process of selffinancing economic growth based on private investment. Only a limited role is allowed for the public sector, which is supposed to operate according to private sector business criteria. Public sector enterprises are therefore encouraged to become profitmaking and wherever possible transfer to the private sector, leaving (in principle and in Togo actually) only a relatively few, mostly strategic activities in the state sector. There is also a strong emphasis on agricultural development [see World Bank 1986:21-4 In the internal market the policy of combining economic austerity with an emphasis on private sector development creates a pattern of demand and supply with a bias towards the production of non-essentials. At the same time, the production of basic articles of mass consumption is inhibited by the usual Table 2 Sources: IMF and World Bank
